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Chapter 11
Can and should the post-riot populist rhetoric be translated into reality?
Dr Vicky Heap and Dr Hannah Smithson
The riots that took place in a number of English cities over the summer of 2011 caught 
police and politicians off  guard, but was the disorder that took place inevitable? This 
Chapter will critically appraise the continually evolving criminal justice and social policy 
frameworks,  which  serve  as  the  benchmark  for  disorderly  conduct  to  be  measured 
against. Initially, we will consider whether modern conceptions of deviance have changed 
since  New  Labour  was  elected  to  govern  in  1997. We  will  then  critique  the  policy 
developments from 1997 to  tpresent day, in an attempt to explain how the spread of 
contractual governance and increased legislation around conduct regulation, could have 
contributed to the societal climate wherein the riots occurred. Finally, we will question 
how the coalition government aims to respond to the riots, their responses to date and 
whether their populist rhetoric pertaining to heightened regulation can be translated into 
effective policy and practice for the future.
A New Era of Deviance? 
Politically, policies towards deviant and disorderly behaviour changed when ‘New’ Labour 
came to power in 1997. During their years in government, Labour demonstrated a shift 
away from class politics, becoming more focused on the regulation of conduct (Crawford, 
2006). This was achieved by making the conscious decision to focus the crime agenda on 
low-level disorder (Phillips and Smith, 2003). Arguably the defining feature of Labour’s 
reign, as well as the starting point for increased conduct regulation, was the creation and 
development  of  legislation surrounding anti-social  behaviour  (hereafter  referred to as 
ASB). There are different perspectives regarding the reasons why Labour focused upon a 
period  of  legislating  around  conduct  regulation  and  ASB.  Mooney  and  Young  (2006) 
suggest that ASB issues were exaggerated in order to demonstrate a tough law and order 
stance  in  light  of  the  ‘crime  drop’1.  Whereas  Burney  (2005)  argues  that  nuisance 
behaviours were targeted as a result of perceived inefficiencies in the criminal justice 
system.  Overall, these political developments have facilitated changes to what type of 
behaviours and what types of people are considered deviant and disorderly.
What constitutes deviant and disorderly behaviour has changed in a variety of different 
ways. Burney (2005) states “once the label ‘anti-social behaviour’ became current, it was 
very easy to  adopt  it  as  a  description of  any  local  irritation or  the  presence of  any 
persons  attracting  disapproval  in  the  public  domain”  (p.4).  Perhaps  with  greater 
reference towards the topic of this Chapter, Matthews and Young (2003) suggest that 
there has been in a decrease in tolerance2 towards crime and incivilities. This reflects 
Labour’s  modified  stance  on  combating  anti-social  and  nuisance  behaviour.  It  also 
demonstrates  a  practical  application  of  Krauthammer’s  (1993)  concept  of  ‘defining 
1 See Hope (2003) and Farrell et al. (2010) for further discussions about the 
‘crime drop’.
2 For further discussions of tolerance see Bannister et al. (2006) and Bannister 
and Kearns (2009).
1
deviancy up’. A reflection upon the modern definition of deviancy was initially provided 
by Moynihan (1993), when he introduced the concept of ‘defining deviancy down’. He 
suggests  that “we  have  been  redefining  deviancy  so  as  to  exempt  much  conduct 
previously stigmatized, and also quietly raising the ‘normal’ level in categories where 
behaviour  is  now  abnormal  by  any  earlier  standard”  (p.19).  Moynihan  explains  how 
deviant  behaviour  has  become  normalised  and  almost  expected,  with  the  sense  of 
outrage being lost particularly in relation to acts of violence. This suggests that tolerance 
has  increased,  although  critics  believe  this  is  far  from  accurate.  In  response  to 
Moynihan’s article, Krauthammer (1993) proposed the concept of defining deviancy up, 
which suggests “as part of the vast social project of moral levelling, it is not enough for 
the deviant to be normalized. The normal must be found to be deviant” (p.20). He claims 
that while the traditional deviancy of criminals is being defined down, ordinary people are 
simultaneously guilty of new forms of deviancy, such as political correctness. As such, he 
proposes that while  the tolerance and threshold of  certain behaviours has increased, 
whereas others have decreased. 
These theories resonate with the idea of nostalgia discussed by Pearson (1983),  who 
suggests that British society holds a deep nostalgia for the way things used to be and 
that each generation sees their issues as being disconnected from the past. This implies 
that defining deviancy up or down is a product of social and moral panics, framed within 
a current period of time. Young (2009) suggests in the modern era, the mass media is 
“buttressed by scientific experts and other moral entrepreneurs” (p.13), reinforcing the 
legitimacy of the moral panic to a large audience. As such, deviancy can not only be 
defined up and down, but can also emerge for an indeterminate period of time as the 
consequence of a moral panic. However, in reality it must be acknowledged that there is 
no robust way of measuring a decline in behaviour over time, as there is no baseline 
available for comparison (Burney, 2005).
The  concepts  mentioned  above  suggest  an  ever-changing,  dynamic  deviancy-
determining landscape. Formal sanctions enacted by the government during the period 
1997-2010, align to the idea of defining deviancy up, shifting towards an increased focus 
on conduct regulation and contractual governance. 
Criminal Justice and Social Policy Frameworks 1997-2010
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998)3, marked the beginning of a raft of conduct regulating 
sanctions.  These  sanctions  took  various  forms  and  regulated  different  aspects  of 
behavioural  conduct,  with arguably the most high-profile conduct regulator being the 
anti-social behaviour order (ASBO). This was followed up by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 
(2003), which introduced dispersal orders allowing the police to disperse groups of two or 
more people within a designated dispersal order zone if they are believed to be causing 
harassment,  alarm or distress. The legal  sanctions were accompanied by an array of 
voluntary  agreements,  such  as  acceptable  behaviour  contracts  (ABCs).  Instances  of 
behavioural regulation via the negotiation of contracts, such as ABCs, have been referred 
to by Crawford (2003) as contractual governance. An increased application of contractual 
governance coupled Labour’s conduct regulating legislation, which spread the application 
of contractual governance beyond the realm of those judged to be ASB perpetrators. For 
3 Despite examples of ASB being defined in the Housing Act (1996), the Crime 
and Disorder Act (1998) was the first time the terminology ‘anti-social behaviour’ 
had been used.
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example,  there  has  been  an  increased  emphasis  on  the  contractual  governance  of 
members  of  the  general  public,  with  the  increased  use  of  tenancy  agreements, 
particularly within the social housing sector. 
A further indication of Labour’s disposition towards increased conduct regulation was the 
spread of enforcement action conducted by civilians. For example, the Police Reform Act 
(2002)  introduced Police  Community  Support  Officers  (PCSOs)  to  the  policing  family, 
whose remit was to provide a frontline response to low level community disorder. These 
officers have been further supplemented by Street Wardens.
One final legislative aspect to consider is the blurring of boundaries between ASB and 
gang-related violence that occurred towards the end of Labour’s tenure. The Police and 
Crime Act (2009) gave provision to grant gang injunctions, so-called ‘gangbos’, which 
bear similarities to the ASBO. These civil  orders are designed to disrupt gang-related 
violence  by  imposing  prohibitions  relating  to  association,  geography,  gang  colours, 
dangerous dogs and the  use  of  the  internet/other  technologies  (Home Office,  2010). 
Originally restricted to those 18 and over, the Crime and Security Act (2010) proposed its 
extension  to  cover  those  aged  14-17.  This  reinforced  their  commitment  to  conduct 
regulation  through  hybrid  law  (civil  orders  becoming  criminal  upon  breach)  and  the 
necessity to govern the conduct (and potential conduct) of perceived trouble-makers. 
Therefore the culmination of Labour’s time in government was to create a society, whose 
behaviour was heavily regulated through both formal means.  The role of informal social 
control should also be recognised. Stenson (2005) argues there are competing levels of 
crime control, including the statutory sovereign agencies mentioned above such as the 
police, as well as other informal sites of governance. For instance, “ethnic, religious and 
other sites of governance in civil society do more than resist state power. They have their 
own agendas of governance, forms of knowledge and expertise deployed to govern and 
maintain solidarity in and over their own territories and populations” (Stenson, 2005: 
267).  In addition to socially constructed forms of informal social control, private forms of 
government should also be acknowledged. For example: CCTV, private security firms and 
gated communities.  It  is  crucial  to  recognise that  none of  these three systems exist 
within a social vacuum (Watt, 2006). 
At this juncture it is pertinent to consider the wider policy and societal context within 
which  the  above  increase  in  conduct  regulation  took  place.  Linking  to  the  proposed 
motivation for the ASB agenda provided by Mooney and Young (2006), during Labour’s 
first  term in  government  there  was  ample  opportunity  to  concentrate  on  crime  and 
disorder because other aspects of governmental  responsibility were not causing such 
concern. This is a marked contrast to the situation faced towards the end of Labour’s 
third term, where the country was in recession and the banking crisis had taken hold. 
Could it be that once in the habit of increasing conduct regulation, this was resorted to by 
default?  
Paradoxically,  the increased behavioural  regulation of  the general  public was coupled 
with the simultaneous de-regulation of financial authorities. Therefore already powerful 
groups, particularly those financially, were able to exercise further power,  whilst those in 
poorer communities who rely on services such as social housing were being increasingly 
regulated, be they perpetrators of disorderly conduct or not. This imbalance in society 
was exacerbated by political scandal, with false expenses claims made by MPs exposed 
in 2009 (Telegraph, 2009). We would argue that the societal climate Labour left behind is 
significant in terms of some of the possible explanations for the summer riots. According 
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to  Mervyn  King,  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England,  we  are  experiencing  the  biggest 
‘financial  crisis  the  world  has  ever  faced’  (The  Guardian,  2011b).  The  Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government are facing unemployment figures which suggest 
that youth unemployment will top one million for the first time since the early 1990s (The 
Guardian, 2011c). Absolute child poverty is also set to rise by 500,000 to three million by 
2015, making it seemingly inevitable that Britain will miss its legal target of reducing 
child poverty to ten per cent or less by 2020 (Brewer et al. 2011).
How did the coalition government set out to respond to criminal justice policy behind the 
backdrop of  growing societal  unrest  around the  recession and the swingeing cuts  to 
public spending? And has this response shifted significantly post-riots?   
The  Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  Coalition  and  Conduct  Regulation:  May 
2010 - August 2011
After  coming  to  power  in  May  2010,  the  Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  coalition 
government took measures to develop criminal justice policies that distanced themselves 
from the trend towards heightened conduct  regulation.  As  early  as  July  2010,  Home 
Secretary Theresa May suggested that it was “time to move beyond the ASBO” (May, 
2010). This bold statement was reinforced with a commitment to empower communities 
and reduce ‘top down’ Whitehall-driven national initiatives (May, 2010). 
Indeed,  the  promise  to  streamline  ASB  sanctions  was  upheld,  with  a  Home  Office 
consultation document to determine more effective solutions to ASB published in early 
2011. The major changes detailed in the consultation document refer to streamlining the 
existing  legislation  into  five  new  powers.  However,  the  rhetoric  surrounding  the 
aforementioned move beyond the ASBO has failed to  come to  fruition.  The two new 
headline orders: the Criminal Behaviour Order and the Crime Prevention Injunction, which 
are set to replace the CrASBO and ASBO, involve little more than a terminological change 
with the addition of a power to impose positive requirements.  
There have also been changes in relation to another flagship Labour creation, Crime and 
Disorder  Reduction  Partnerships,  having  been  re-branded  as  Community  Safety 
Partnerships (CSPs) in 2010. A final area of change relating to crime and disorder is the 
implementation  of  locally  elected  Police  and  Crime  Commissioners  (PCCs),  with 
legislation contained in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011). This policy 
reinforces the drive towards a local crime reduction agenda and holding public services 
to account. 
The remaining key policy that deserves our attention is Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
‘big society’ plan, as this also pertains to a decrease in conduct regulation. What exactly 
the big society is, or perhaps more importantly how it will be achieved is a little unclear.  
In  relation  to  crime  reduction,  the  roots  are  firmly  within  the  remit  of  social  crime 
prevention, with plans to; reduce poverty, increase employability, improve parenting, and 
to move away from top-down centrally driven policies giving more power to communities 
and charities (Cameron, 2011b). The amalgamation of policies that create the big society 
plan, suggest a decentralised approach towards governance in general, which includes 
conduct regulation. 
Overall,  each  of  these  policy  shifts  emphasise  a  renewed  attitude  towards  conduct 
regulation and a focus on locally driven campaigns to reduce crime, disorder and ASB. 
Could this new direction have already been muted by the policy response post-riots?
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The Post-Riots Policy Response
Many of the policy responses outlined post-riots were rhetoric-laden and hinting towards 
a return to centralised crime reduction campaigns. These statements were made before 
many of the plans outlined above had the opportunity to begin. 
Within  days  of  the  first  riots  occurring,  the  Home  Secretary  addressed  parliament, 
stating: “the violence we have seen over the past five days is the symptom of something 
very deeply  wrong with our  society”  (May,  2011).  Her speech continued to  highlight 
various policy issues such as welfare, education and the police response. However, it was 
clear that at this early stage the Home Secretary believed that gangs were responsible 
for the rioting and disorder that took place. To quote May (2011) once more, she said: 
“Why does a violent gang culture exist in so many of our towns and cities?” proceeding 
to suggest that many of the perpetrators of the disorder were indeed gang members. 
These assumptions were reinforced by the announcement of funding totalling £8million 
to be spent in the cities where rioting has taken place. Furthermore, it was announced 
that gang injunctions (gangbos) for young people, which were due to be piloted in 2011 
as part of the Crime and Security Act (2010), were to be immediately rolled-out on a 
national scale. This policy marks a shift back towards the conduct regulation associated 
with the previous government and directly opposes the new streamlined, community-
focused stance relating to ASB and crime reduction.
 
Despite initial concerns surrounding gang involvement, new data released by the Home 
Office in October 2011 suggests that these concerns were unfounded. Aggregated data 
for all areas that suffered disorder, show that 13% of all arrestees had a gang affiliation 
(Home Office, 2011c). This demonstrates that the government’s response to the riots in 
relation  to  gang  involvement  has  been  disproportionate  to  their  involvement  in  the 
events. The report also states that: “in terms of the role gangs played in the disorder, 
most forces perceived that where gang members were involved, they generally did not 
play a pivotal role” (Home Office, 2011c: 19). Therefore will the Coalition continue to 
pursue a gang-based strategy, based on the evidence that suggests they were not a 
crucial factor? The answer is yes, the obsession with prioritising gangs as the cause and 
result  of  societal  breakdown  is  illustrated  by  the  Work  and  Pensions  Secretary,  Iain 
Duncan  Smith’s  stance  on  the  problem.  Duncan  Smith  said:  "I  am  talking  about 
intervening when the child is conceived, not even when born. The kids we are talking 
about – half of them are unable to speak, cannot form sentences, they have no sense of 
empathy,  they  cannot  share  toys  at  school,  they  watch  their  mums  get  beaten  up 
regularly and sexually abused.” (The Guardian, 2011d).  Duncan Smith and the Home 
Secretary Theresa May published the post-riot response to gangs in the recent report 
‘Ending Gang and Youth Violence: A Cross Government Report including further evidence 
and good practice case studies’ (HM Government 2011).     
 
Ending Gang and Youth Violence
The approach to be taken by the Coalition and set out in the above report consists of five 
key  clear  aims  providing  support,  prevention,  pathways  out  of  punishment  and 
enforcement and partnership working. The emphasis of the report is on identifying and 
intervening in the lives of  ‘troubled families’.  It  cannot be overly stressed that early 
intervention  is  key,  through  the  use  of  universal  parenting  classes,  family  nurse 
partnerships (FNPs) - targeted intensive home visiting for first time teenage mothers, 
extending free nursery entitlement to disadvantaged two year olds and recruiting an 
additional 4200 health visitors by 2015 The overall aim is to “turn around the lives of the 
5
120,000 most troubled families by 2015” (HM Government 2011:22). According to the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2012), a troubled family exhibits at 
least five of the following characteristics: no one in the family is in work; living in poor or 
overcrowded  housing;  no  parent  has  any  qualifications;  mother  has  mental  health 
problems; at least one parent has a longstanding illness,  disability or infirmity;  a low 
income; and the inability to afford a number of food, clothing items. 
In the months following the initial reactions to the riots, further indications have been 
given about the policy direction the government intends to pursue. In October 2011, it 
was announced that Louise Casey, former ‘Respect’ tsar and Victims’ Commissioner, was 
appointed as head of the newly formed Troubled Families Team based in the Department 
for Communities and Local Government. 
Akin to most of the policies highlighted in this Chapter, there is little detail about exactly 
how this will be achieved. However, the focus on ‘problem’ families is not new, having 
first been mentioned in the Respect Action Plan (2006), based on the success of the 
Dundee Families Project in 1995. Family Intervention Projects (FIPs) have been utilised 
since the Respect agenda as a means of providing support, be it in relation to offending 
or  more  generally  through  the  co-ordination  welfare  services.  Two  pieces  of  recent 
evidence  published  by  both  the  Department  for  Education  (2011b)  and  Action  for 
Children (2011), suggest that FIPs have been successful at reducing crime and ASB, as 
well  as  improving  health  risks  and  educational  attainment.  This  provides  a  useful 
indication of  successful  practice.  Potentially  one of  the biggest challenges facing the 
Troubled Families Team is the scale of the problem and the ambitious figure of 120,000 
families to be assisted. Figures from the Department for Education (2011b) report show 
that 5,461 families accepted help from FIPs in the 2010/11 financial year. This is a small 
proportion  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  target  and  although  it  is  not  anticipated  that  all 
120,000  families  would  be  helped  in  one  year,  some  innovative  thinking  around 
economies of scale is required if  the 120,000 target is to be met by the end of this 
government’s term in office. According to the Department for Communities and Local 
Government website (2012),  £448 million pounds has been allocated to the Troubled 
Families Team, which requires match-funding from local areas and will  be based upon 
payment by results (exact details of how this will work in practice are yet to be detailed). 
Will payment by results increase the extent of intervention in family’s lives, if funding for 
the Troubled Families Team is reliant not only upon the numbers of families they engage 
with but  also  the rates  of  success  of  keeping these families  out  of  ‘trouble’?  It  is  a 
substantial financial commitment, particularly in times of austerity. However it is difficult 
to determine whether this will be enough, as the costs of providing these services is not 
readily available. Overall, this is a further example of a centrally driven approach to riots 
response.
The second opportunity for the government to provide an insight into their preferred 
method of dealing with the disorder fell to Prime Minister David Cameron. In his speech 
at a youth club in Whitney, Cameron returned to his ‘big society’ agenda and claimed a 
renewed interest in what is one of his defining policies. He said, “we’ve got to be tough, 
we’ve got to be robust, we’ve got to score a clear line between right and wrong right 
through the heart of this country” (Cameron, 2011c). Such heavy rhetoric was followed 
by few tangible examples of how this could be translated into reality. Although these 
included: providing a stronger police presence, reducing police bureaucracy, improving 
parenting,  improving  educational  standards,  increased  community  and  social 
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responsibility, and getting people into employment. 
A further populist policy was also highlighted, namely National Citizen Service (NCS). This 
is an eight week, voluntary programme for sixteen year-olds that helps to develop their 
personal skills in preparation for adult life. The scheme is being piloted in 2012, with 
places  available  for  30,000  young  people  (Department  for  Education,  2011a).   This 
scheme is supposedly akin to National Service but despite the best intentions of  the 
government to create a value driven programme of development for young people, there 
are obvious differences between these two schemes. The difficulty in implementing the 
voluntary NCS effectively will be the accurate targeting of at-risk young people to be 
involved,  particularly  when young people  are  being encouraged to  apply  themselves 
(Directgov Website, 2011). We shall return to issues of implementation later.
A final key issue emphasised by Cameron in his speech was punishment. He promised 
“proper  punishment”  (Cameron,  2011b)  for  those  involved  in  gangs,  criminality  and 
disorderly behaviour. This neat sound-bite was not reinforced with any policy direction, 
but it hinted towards a draconian sentencing regimen of imprisonment. Indeed Cameron 
said  whilst  addressing  the  House  of  Commons,  that  “anyone  charged  with  violent 
disorder and other serious offences should expect to be remanded in custody not let 
back on the streets and anyone convicted should expect to go to jail” (Cameron, 2011c 
quoted in The Daily Telegraph, 2011). May’s earlier speech to the House of Common’s 
had  also  alluded  to  this  strategy,  suggesting  that  the  disorderly  tide  was  “turning 
because the thugs are being arrested and locked up” (May, 2011). More recent rhetoric 
from the Work and Pensions Secretary alludes to the idea that if you can prove someone 
belongs to a gang, then their prison sentence could be doubled. (The Guardian, 2011e). 
It  appears  the notion of  proper punishment  has been embraced by the Metropolitan 
Police, who have named and shamed those convicted of offences connected to the riots. 
In December 2011, under the auspices of Operation Withern, they posted photographs 
and personal details of sixty-four convicted offenders on the website Flickr. The details 
included the offenders’ name, date of birth, street where they live, the sentence they 
received and the crime they committed. A further two-hundred photographs of  those 
they wish to speak to regarding the riots have also been posted. This demonstrates one 
way the rhetoric surrounding punishment has been translated into realty.
However,  is  the  Conservative  proportion  of  the  coalition  therefore  reverting  back  to 
traditional right-wing ideologies of punishment to gain a populist advantage? There is 
evidence to suggest that they are. Data from the Ministry of Justice suggest that those 
brought before both the Magistrates’ and Crown Courts as a result of being involved in 
the riots, faced harsher sentencing in comparison to similar offences committed in the 
previous year.  For example, “at the Crown Court,  89 people have been sentenced of 
whom 79 (89 per cent) received immediate custodial sentences, the average length of 
custodial sentence was 18.5 months compared with 11.3 months in England and Wales in 
2010” (Ministry of Justice, 2011: 4). Official figures were reinforced by stories in the print 
media recounting disproportionate sentences, for example: for example: a student from 
London was jailed for six months for stealing water bottles worth £3.50 (The Guardian, 
2011f). This harsh attitude towards sentencing sparked criticism from the Howard League 
for Penal Reform who issued a statement suggesting that sentences “should be balanced 
against a key principle of criminal justice, that of proportionality” (Howard League for 
Penal Reform, 2011). Perhaps the Conservatives have always favoured a return to their 
right-wing punishment ideals, but prior to the rioting had no tangible excuse to heavily 
invest in such a plan during difficult economic times?  It is worth briefly reflecting upon 
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why the  government  would  take  this  stance,  considering  the  parallels  which  can be 
drawn to traditional conservative policies. Are these populist policies a means of fuelling 
public confidence in the government in light of the swingeing public spending cuts? How 
long will the rhetoric surrounding the riots last? And, will it be translated into mainstream 
criminal justice policy on a more long-term basis?
During the above policy announcements the Liberal Democrat aspect of the Coalition has 
remained relatively quiet. However, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg used the platform 
of his party’s annual conference to announce the creation of summer schools for young 
people, as a way of dealing with some of the perceived causes of the riots. Summer 
schools will involve at-risk young people attending school for two weeks of the summer 
holidays prior to them attending secondary school, with the remit of them catching up on 
key skills in English and Mathematics. The scheme will cost £50million to run for one year 
(Clegg, 2011). This is another Whitehall-driven policy that reverts back to previous ‘top-
down’ style of government. 
Much has been written about the criminalisation of social policy that is perceived to have 
taken place since the early 2000s4. Perhaps post-riots we are moving into an era where 
welfare policy has an undertone of riot prevention, which suggests an unsubstantiated 
causal link between welfare dependence and disorder/criminal behaviour? In that sense, 
are we witnessing a new phase of defining deviancy up, where those who are welfare 
dependent are further stigmatised and considered as deviant by default? This would be 
in addition to the marginalisation this group of people already contend with by being 
labelled as the ‘underclass’ (Murray, 1990).
Conclusions and Implications for the Future
The social  implications  of  the  riots  and the  ensuing policy  pledges are  beginning  to 
unfold. Will the fear of crime increase? How will confidence levels in local authorities be 
affected, if at all? How will this affect frontline crime reduction practice? Many of the 
policy directions announced post-riots revert to a top-down agenda; the focus on gangs, 
early intervention, NCS, punishment and imprisonment, ‘summer schools’ and the new 
Troubled Families Team. This notion contradicts the de-centralised approach promised by 
May back in 2010. Time will tell as to whether any of these headline policies will be able 
to  be  adapted  and  implemented  effectively  at  a  local  level.  Issues  surrounding  the 
targeting of at-risk individuals will be key, particularly if the NCS, ‘summer school’ and 
gang initiatives are to serve their purpose. The notion of responsibility is crucial here. 
CSPs will undoubtedly have a key role to play in co-ordinating what is delivered at local  
level, but with the impact of reduced public sector budgets will these authorities have the 
physical and economic capacity to do this effectively? The introduction of local PCCs may 
be the beacon of hope for the localism agenda, but this relies heavily upon the quality 
and experience of the candidates selected. 
The key issue remains; can and should all the populist rhetoric be able to be translated 
into reality?
Translating criminal justice policy into effective crime reduction practice is no easy task. 
From the recent Coalition policy announcements it appears that a cycle of legislation is 
occurring.  This  existing  legislation  is  being  streamlined  (ASB  sanctions),  while  new 
conduct regulating legislation is being brought in (gangbos for under eighteens). This 
4 See Gilling (2001) and Squires (2006)
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cycle suggests that the Coalition also appear to resort to conduct regulation as a default 
legislating  framework.  Does  this  cycle  really  provide  tangible  conditions  for  societal 
change and/or progress?  Or, is the past simply being repeated?
Word Count: 4588
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